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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, we hold that the Secretary of Labor does not 
have the authority, even with the consent of the parties, to 
enforce a settlement agreement resolving a retaliation claim 
brought by an employee/whistleblower against his 
employer under the Energy Reorganization Act. We also 
conclude that, as a matter of law, the Secretary 
misconstrued the agreement when he found no breach of 
the agreement by the employer. Accordingly, we will grant 
the petition for review and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Petitioner Bert Williams filed a complaint with the 
Department of Labor under the Energy Reorganization Act 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 5851. He alleged that his employer, 
Public Service Electric and Gas Company ("the company"), 
had retaliated against him for raising a nuclear safety 
violation that ultimately resulted in an $80,000 penalty 
against the company. A preliminary investigation by the 
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Regional Office of the Department favored Williams. The 
company sought an administrative hearing, but before the 
retaliation claim reached an ALJ, Williams and the 
company arrived at a settlement. 
 
Williams was 62 years of age at the time of the 
settlement, and it was decided that Williams would take an 
early retirement. The agreement recited that he would 
immediately receive benefits as if he had continued to work 
until normal retirement at age 65. The Secretary approved 
this settlement on June 8, 1994 and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice. 
 
When the company began sending monthly payments in 
amounts less than Williams anticipated, he asserted a 
breach of the settlement agreement. He prepared and filed 
a "Motion for Sanctions and to Enforce Settlement" with the 
ALJ to whom the original complaint had been assigned in 
which he asked the Secretary to enforce the agreement or, 
in the alternative, bring an enforcement action in the 
district court on his behalf. 
 
The parties agree that the company had purchased an 
annuity policy from an insurance company to fund its 
obligations under the settlement agreement and that, on its 
face, the policy would have paid the required amount per 
month. However, because of the way the company 
structured the annuity, withholding taxes reduced the 
monthly payments substantially below the amount specified 
in the agreement. It appears that the company unilaterally 
selected the method of providing the retirement benefits, 
but in defending its action, the company asserted that the 
funding had been complicated by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et seq., (ERISA) and 
the withholding provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
 
When presented with Williams' motion, the ALJ ruled 
that he no longer had jurisdiction because the case had 
previously been forwarded to the Secretary. Williams then 
asked the Secretary either to remand the matter to the ALJ 
"for enforcement of the terms of the Agreement and Order 
or initiate, or join in, an action in the District Court to 
enforce your Order." 
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The then Secretary, Robert Reich, rejected the company's 
argument that enforcement "must be sought in the United 
States District Court" and found that he had authority to 
consider enforcement under the agreement's express 
provision that "the Department of Labor shall retain 
jurisdiction of this matter for purposes of enforcement of 
this Agreement." Moreover, the agreement gave Williams the 
"right to seek enforcement of the Agreement through the 
Department of Labor" in the event of a material breach by 
the company. 
 
Remarking that "[i]t is clear that [the company] has not 
paid Williams the agreed amount reflecting an annuity with 
a survivor benefit," the Secretary questioned"whether [the 
company] was required to make all the [tax] deductions up 
front." He therefore remanded to an ALJ to "receive 
evidence regarding the appropriate tax treatment of the 
annuity and whether [the company] breached the 
Agreement." 
 
Before the ALJ, Williams contended that the company 
had promised him full retirement benefits payable at age 62 
rather than at age 65, and therefore he should pay taxes in 
the same manner as other retirees. He said that he had 
never applied for an annuity policy, nor had he been given 
the option for a lump sum payment as is customary with 
such contracts. To combat any suggestion that the 
company's action had been dictated by applicable law, 
Williams submitted an expert's report that explored 
alternative means for funding that would have yielded the 
agreed upon monthly benefits without running afoul of 
ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code. 
 
In defense, the company first explained the tax 
consequences of purchasing a lump sum annuity. Next, the 
company said it chose to buy an annuity policy rather than 
make monthly payments from company funds because that 
method might have subjected future payments to the risk 
of the company's insolvency. The company never submitted 
that option or any others, however, to Williams for his 
consideration. 
 
The ALJ concluded that the company had not breached 
the agreement and denied Williams' motion. The 
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Administrative Review Board, authorized by the Secretary 
to issue final decisions, affirmed.1  
 
I. 
 
Since resolution of many of the issues raised by this 
appeal turns on the nature of the proceedings that occurred 
before the agency, we think it helpful to begin by observing 
that the record is subject to two characterizations. Williams 
asked the Secretary to enforce the agreement, or in the 
alternative, to "initiate, or join in" an action in the district 
court. At various points in our discussion, we consider 
whether the Secretary asserted authority to enforce the 
agreement himself or held a preliminary fact-finding 
proceeding simply to inform his decision whether to pursue 
enforcement on Williams' behalf. Overall, either 
characterization raises concerns about the nature of the 
Secretary's action in this case. 
 
With this clarification, we preliminarily raise, sua sponte, 
the issue of subject matter competence -- that is, the 
authority of the Secretary of Labor to enforce a settlement 
agreement. The Act provides that either the Secretary or a 
party may seek enforcement of a settlement in the district 
court. 42 U.S.C. S 5851(d),(e). See also 24 C.F.R. S 24.8. 
There is, however, no language authorizing the Secretary to 
enforce without resorting to the district court. 
 
In Macktal v. Secretary of Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, 1153 
(5th Cir. 1991), the court recognized that the Act authorizes 
the Secretary to act in one of three ways -- to grant or deny 
the relief sought in a complaint, or to approve a settlement. 
The Court explicitly rejected proffered analogies to civil 
litigation in determining the extent of the Secretary's 
jurisdiction: "[w]hile such analogies may be helpful, an 
analogy cannot give the Secretary authority withheld by the 
words of the statute, nor can analogies deprive the 
Secretary of authority provided by the words of the statute." 
Id. Thus, the Court held that the Secretary is authorized to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Administrative Review Board designated its order as "final." The 
Secretary of Labor has delegated authority to the Board to issue final 
agency orders under the Energy Reorganization Act. 29 C.F.R. S 2.8. 
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approve or disapprove a settlement by the parties, but 
cannot modify its terms without their consent. Id. at 1154. 
 
Like the court in Macktal, we are faced with an action by 
the Secretary beyond the scope of his statutorily prescribed 
authority. Unlike in Macktal, however, the parties here do 
not question the Secretary's authority to assert jurisdiction. 
The question is whether the matter is of any consequence. 
We think that it is. 
 
A suit for breach of contract is a common law action of 
ancient vintage and is properly cognizable in Article III 
courts. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833 (1986), the Supreme Court held that 
Congress could authorize an administrative agency to 
adjudicate a common law claim between two individuals in 
connection with a regulatory proceeding. The Court noted 
that a litigant having a personal right to an impartial and 
independent federal court adjudication could waive that 
right. Id. at 848. In Schor, the record demonstrated that the 
complainant had elected to seek relief before the agency 
rather than proceeding to judgment in a state or federal 
court on his claim. Id. at 849-50. 
 
Despite the waiver, however, the court discussed whether 
the Commodities Exchange Act violated the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine, which prevents "the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." 
Id. at 850, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) 
(per curiam). In this context, the Court observed, "[t]o the 
extent that this structural principle is implicated in a given 
case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional 
difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent 
cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction 
beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, S 2." Id. at 
850-51. 
 
In this case, the parties are attempting to vest 
consensual jurisdiction in the Secretary to perform a 
function that Congress has explicitly placed in the district 
court. The issue is thus based on a statutory allocation of 
powers rather than a constitutional one. We believe, 
however, that Schor provides the guiding principle in these 
circumstances. Allowing the parties' waiver to grant power 
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to an executive agency where the statute places that 
authority in the judicial branch impermissibly flies in the 
face of the intent of the statute. Congress could have given 
the Secretary the jurisdiction that the parties assert here, 
but chose not to do so. 
 
It is significant that the Secretary does not claim a 
general power to adjudicate disputes over the terms of 
settlement agreements. In the proceedings of Pillow v. 
Bechtel Construction, Inc., ARB Case No. 97-040, 1997 WL 
563822 (Sept. 11, 1997), the Administrative Review Board 
agreed "with the general proposition that after afinal 
decision has been issued, the Board lacks jurisdiction over 
a dispute about the proper interpretation of a settlement 
agreement." Id. at *2. In making that pronouncement, the 
Board cited and distinguished the case before us as an 
example where jurisdiction was retained by an express 
provision in the agreement. Id. 
 
In the order remanding this case to the ALJ, the 
Secretary concluded that "the retention of jurisdiction 
clause [in the agreement] authorizes the Department to 
hold further administrative proceedings prior to either the 
Department or a party seeking enforcement in the district 
court . . . [T]here is a genuine dispute whether [the 
company] has breached the Agreement and I will exercise 
my retained jurisdiction to resolve that dispute." 
 
The Secretary cited Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance 
Company of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), for support. In 
that case, the Court held that federal district courts have 
no inherent authority to enforce a settlement once a final 
judgment has been entered, but may do so if the agreement 
expressly retains jurisdiction in the court for enforcement 
purposes. Id. at 381. Unlike a district court, however, the 
Secretary has no power to enforce under this Act and 
therefore has no jurisdiction to retain. The Secretary's 
authorization is limited to seeking enforcement in the 
district court. 
 
We can perceive the value to the Secretary of having an 
explanation of the parties' dispute in the interest of making 
an informed decision whether to proceed in the district 
court. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
 
                                7 
  
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) 
(agencies should be free to devise methods of inquiry 
capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous 
duties). That explanation, however, does not support the 
Secretary's authority in other situations to make a formal 
adjudication entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent 
district court actions. See United States v. Utah Constr. and 
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (res judicata may 
attach to issues resolved in adjudicative administrative 
proceeding); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 885 
F.2d 551, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 
If the Secretary's decision serves to block full 
consideration of the merits in the district court, then the 
Secretary has done indirectly what is ultra vires if done 
directly. For example, should the Secretary decide that one 
party has breached a settlement agreement, the other party 
in a subsequent enforcement action in the district court 
could invoke claim preclusion to bar a complete 
determination on the merits by the district court.2 Such a 
result could effectively make the district court proceeding 
superfluous. 
 
In sum, the Secretary may utilize an informal fact 
gathering proceeding preliminary to enforcement. But since 
the Act does not authorize direct enforcement or indirect 
enforcement by the Secretary, a formal adjudicative 
proceeding cannot limit the scope of a district court 
enforcement suit. 
 
II. 
 
From the outset, the company has challenged this 
Court's jurisdiction to review the Secretary's order denying 
Williams' motions and we now turn our attention to that 
issue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At oral argument, counsel for the Company stated that it would assert 
res judicata and the "election of remedies" doctrine. Counsel for the 
Secretary contended that as a result of the agency action, Williams 
would be barred from seeking enforcement in the district court should 
he decide to bring suit there. But see Richard B. Stewart and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L.Rev. 1195, 
1216, 1289 (1982). 
 
                                8 
  
In this case, jurisdiction to review administrative agency 
orders has been established by the statute authorizing 
agency action. Under 42 U.S.C. S 5851(b)(2)(A), the 
Secretary of Labor, upon receipt of a whistle blower 
complaint, must issue an order either granting relief, 
denying relief, or approving a settlement agreement. Such 
agreements are entered into by the Secretary and the 
offending party with the participation and consent of the 
complainant. Subsection (c)(1) provides that "[a]ny person 
adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under 
subsection (b) . . . may obtain review of the order in the 
United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the 
violation . . . occurred." 
 
The company mounts two attacks on our jurisdiction. 
The first is straightforward. Section 5851(b) authorizes the 
Secretary to issue three types of orders: 
 
       1. an order granting relief; 
 
       2. an order denying the complaint; and 
 
       3. an order settling the dispute. 
 
The company contends that because the order Williams 
would have us review is none of these three designated 
types, it does not come within our jurisdiction. 
 
Adopting the company's position would impose a 
cramped interpretation on the scope of judicial review of 
administrative decisions. As the Supreme Court remarked 
in Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768 
(1985): "We have often noted that `only upon a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative 
intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.' " 
Id. at 778, quoting Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 
141 (1967); see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 
421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975) (even where review is limited, 
agency must explain its action). We start then with the 
presumption that judicial review is available. Only in 
unusual circumstances will a party aggrieved by an agency 
decision be denied access to the courts. 
 
As we observed in Vineland Chemical Co. v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d 402, 405 (3d 
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Cir. 1987), "[w]hile a statutory basis for jurisdiction is 
required," case law "caution[s] this court not to construe 
appellate review provisions too narrowly. To avoid 
unintended and anomalous results, statutes authorizing 
review of specified agency actions should be construed to 
allow review of agency actions which are `functionally 
similar' or `tantamount to' those specified actions." 
Similarly, in Modine Manufacturing Corp. v. Kay, 791 F.2d 
267, 270 (3d Cir. 1986), we stated that where a statute 
allows for some appellate review of agency action, the 
"jurisdictional provisions should be construed generously 
absent clear and convincing evidence of a contrary 
congressional intent." 
 
We have found nothing in the legislative history of the 
Energy Reorganization Act to indicate that Congress 
intended to restrict judicial review of rulings made in the 
course of administrative proceedings. Additionally, as we 
noted in Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. United 
States Department of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 479 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1993), several federal statutes contain whistleblower 
protection provisions identical or similar to those of the 
Energy Reorganization Act. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. S 1367 
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C. S 7622 
(Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. S 9610 (Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); 
42 U.S.C. S 300j-9(i) (Safe Water Drinking Act); 42 U.S.C. 
S 6971 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 15 
U.S.C. S 2622 (Toxic Substances Control Act); 30 U.S.C. 
S 815(c)(1) (Federal Mine Safety and Health Act); 29 U.S.C. 
S 158(a)(4) (National Labor Relations Act); 45 U.S.C. S 441(a) 
(Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act). Nothing in the 
legislative history or judicial interpretation of these similar 
provisions causes us to question application of the general 
principle favoring judicial review of agency decision-making. 
 
Opinions from other Courts of Appeals addressing 
jurisdiction under the Energy Reorganization Act provide 
little guidance in the circumstances here. In Carolina Power 
and Light v. United States Department of Labor, 43 F.3d 912 
(4th Cir. 1995), the Court was asked to review an order of 
the Secretary remanding a proposed settlement to an ALJ. 
The Court held that the order was not subject to judicial 
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review because it was not final and not entered under 
subsection (b) of S 5851. Id. at 914-15. In Macktal, the 
Court disapproved the action of the Secretary in striking 
certain provisions from a settlement previously arrived at 
by the employee and the employer. 923 F.2d at 1154. 
Jurisdiction to review was assumed with little discussion. 
Id. 
 
In Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hospital v. Marshall, 629 
F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1980), an employer petitioned for review 
of the Secretary's order granting relief to an employee. The 
employee intervened, requesting enforcement. Id. at 566. 
The Court denied review of the Secretary's order as to the 
employer, but concluded that the employee's motion for 
enforcement should have been brought in the district court. 
Id. 
 
In the absence of persuasive authority adopting a limited 
reading of the Act's review provisions, we read them broadly 
in conformity with the philosophy expressed in our case 
law. In Vineland, we concluded that statutory provisions for 
judicial review of the Secretary's action "issuing, denying, 
modifying, or revoking" a permit extended to all orders 
terminating interim status under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act. 810 F.2d at 408. Similarly, 
in Modine, we held that appellate jurisdiction for review of 
effluent standards promulgated under the Clean Water Act 
extended to rulings on the applicability of those standards 
to a specific discharger. 791 F.2d at 271. In both Vineland 
and Modine, the governing statutory provisions did not 
specifically cover the orders presented for review. 
Nevertheless, we assumed jurisdiction. See Dart v. United 
States, 848 F.2d 217, 221, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (judicial 
review is favored when an agency is acting beyond its 
authority). 
 
Those precedents provide guidance here. We consider the 
ruling of the Secretary an adjudicatory construction of the 
previously approved settlement agreement. See Macktal, 
923 F.2d at 1154. That action resulted in the Secretary's 
decision to forego enforcement in the district court. In the 
circumstances here, we conclude that the petition for 
review falls within the appellate jurisdiction authorized by 
the Act. 
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The second part of the jurisdictional attack is focused on 
the company's view that the Secretary's order represents a 
decision not to begin a suit in the district court. As such, 
the company argues that the Secretary's action is akin to 
the decision not to enforce which was held to be 
discretionary and unreviewable in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821 (1985). 
 
The proceeding also bears a resemblance to that in 
Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 562-65. There, the Supreme Court held 
that the Secretary of Labor's decision not to request the 
district court to set aside a union election was judicially 
reviewable and that the Secretary should submit a 
statement of his reasons for nonaction. Id. at 566-68. 
 
The situation presented here is distinguishable from 
Chaney. There, the Court held that the Food and Drug 
Administration's refusal to enforce the substantive 
prohibitions in its enabling act was nonreviewable. The 
Court noted the important differences between an agency's 
decision to enforce and one declining to do so. 470 U.S. at 
831-32. Although acknowledging that administrative 
concerns such as allocation of resources and policy 
considerations must enter into the balance, the Court 
discussed another factor affecting the enforcement decision: 
"[W]hen an agency refuses to act it generally does not 
exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or 
property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that 
courts often are called upon to protect." Id . at 832 
(emphasis in original). In contrast, where the agency does 
move to enforce, that action provides a focus for judicial 
review and can at least "be reviewed to determine whether 
the agency exceeded its statutory powers." Id. 
 
The Secretary's decision not to seek enforcement in this 
case is fundamentally different from the non-action 
examined in Chaney. Here, the Secretary has taken 
affirmative steps to adjudicate a breach of contract claim. 
Because that proceeding ultimately determined the amount 
of the monthly payments to be made to Williams, it directly 
affected his property rights. 
 
In contrast to Chaney, the Secretary's decision not to 
proceed with enforcement in the district court in this case 
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was not based on consideration of the agency's policy or 
resources, but rather upon a contractual construction. See 
S.E.C. v. Chaney Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943); Florida 
Dep't of Labor and Employment Sec. v. United States Dep't 
of Labor, 893 F.2d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 1990) ("An 
important corollary to the general rule that courts will not 
substitute their views for the discretionary decisions of an 
agency on matters of policy is the recognition that reviewing 
courts do have the authority and responsibility to correct 
errors of law made by the agency"). The ruling of the 
Secretary, if allowed to stand, could have claim or issue 
preclusive effect and prevent Williams from obtaining relief 
in the district court. See Utah Construction, 384 U.S. at 
422; see also Thompson, 885 F.2d at 556-57. Thus, this 
case presents agency action that bears on property rights in 
an area in which courts typically act. 
 
Adoption of the company's argument that Chaney bars 
review here would actually undermine the reasoning in 
that case by ignoring the factors that generated its holding. 
Our cases that followed Chaney, such as New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy v. Long 
Island Power Authority, 30 F.3d 403, 418 n.27 (3d Cir. 
1994) and Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, 
815 F.2d 949, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1987), are similarly 
distinguishable. We therefore reject the company's 
contention that Chaney is applicable here. 
 
We indicated earlier our misgivings about the legitimacy 
of the Secretary's conclusions derived from the hearing 
to the extent that they could be considered indirect 
enforcement. Although there is some basis for 
characterizing the proceedings as informal and non- 
binding, the stronger indication is that the Secretary 
considered them to be a formal adjudication. However, 
rather than resting our decision solely on the basis of ultra 
vires agency action, in view of the ambiguous state of the 
record, the interests of judicial efficiency, and the fact that 
the parties fully briefed the issues, we will address the 
merits as well. In this connection, we note that there are no 
issues of fact in controversy and the administrative record 
is fully developed. See Modine, 791 F.2d at 270. 
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III. 
 
Judicial review under the Act is to conform with the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 42 U.S.C. S 5851(c)(1). Thus, 
we must determine whether the agency ruling is "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A). 
 
Basic contract principles apply to settlement agreements. 
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 875 F.2d 
43, 45 (3d Cir. 1989). This settlement agreement involves a 
right to sue derived from a federal statute and, 
consequently, federal common law principles govern 
construction of the contract. See Town of Newton v. 
Rummery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Macktal, 923 F.2d at 
1157 n.32. 
 
It is surely debatable whether a court owes any deference 
to an administrative agency's construction of a contract 
that lies outside its area of expertise, as is the case here. 
See New York State Electric & Gas, 875 F.2d at 45 (contract 
principles generally applicable to construction of settlement 
agreement unless it is ambiguous and deference to 
Commission's interpretation based on specialized industry 
knowledge may be appropriate). We need not digress into a 
discussion of whether a more extensive scrutiny is 
appropriate, however, because whether we apply the 
Administrative Procedure Act's standard or that applicable 
to the appeal of a district court judgment, we owe no 
deference to an erroneous conclusion of law. See , e.g., Dill 
v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d 25, 28 (3d Cir. 1985) (on questions of 
law, administrative judgment is subject to plenary judicial 
review). 
 
IV. 
 
Section 15 of the agreement provides that Williams: 
 
       "will receive a retirement benefit based upon a single 
       life annuity in the amount of not less than [$926.96] 
       per month and such other benefits as are in 
       accordance with [the company's] pension plan, 
       including . . . rights under, the `Medical-Dental 
       Benefits Plan for Retired Employees'. . . . Mr. Williams 
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       is further entitled to increases in his retirement and 
       other benefits as the company may subsequently grant 
       to company retirees. [The Company] represents that 
       this amount meets or exceeds the monthly benefit that 
       Mr. Williams would have received if he had held a 
       Grade 14 compensation classification, at a job value of 
       [$68,618], for the three-year period immediately 
       preceding April 1, 1994. In order to pay this benefit, 
       [the company] shall supplement the pension plan 
       benefits to which Mr. Williams would otherwise be 
       entitled under the pension plan." 
 
Later, when Williams chose to receive a 50% joint and 
survivor annuity rather than a single one, it was agreed 
that the monthly amount would be reduced to $782.35. The 
settlement agreement does not specify the manner in which 
the company was to fulfill its commitment to Williams, nor 
touch in any way upon the allocation of taxes. The 
company purchased an annuity policy after having been 
advised by an insurance agent that, for a cost of 
$60,655.85, the policy would provide the agreed monthly 
benefit amount of $782.35. 
 
Concluding that the $60,655.85 would be taxable income 
to Williams, the company withheld state and federal taxes 
due on that sum and used the remaining $37,382.00 to 
buy the annuity policy.3 As a result, Williams received 
monthly checks of $477.13, rather than the expected 
amount of $782.35. 
 
Construction of a contract is different than interpretation 
and is purely a question of law subject to de novo review. 
Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 
1052-53 (3d Cir. 1984). "In determining the legal effect an 
agreement will have on an event the parties did not foresee, 
the process is construction, not interpretation." Id. at 1053. 
See also 3 Corbin on Contracts S 534, at 12 (2nd ed. 1960); 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 200 cmt. c, at 82 
(1981). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Apparently, receipt of other financial consideration included in the 
agreement resulted in a ballooning of Williams' income in 1994 
catapulting him into the highest tax bracket in that year. 
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Interpretation of the contractual language is the first step 
towards proper construction. Corbin S 534, at 9, 11. In the 
process of interpreting a contract, the court seeks to 
ascertain the intent of the parties. Barco Urban Renewal 
Corp. v. Housing Auth., 674 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1982); 
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 
1001, 1009-1012 (3d Cir. 1980). That inquiry, however, 
does not require a search for the subjective intent of the 
parties, but rather centers on the intent embodied in the 
language that the parties chose to memorialize their 
agreement. Barco Urban Renewal, 674 F.2d at 1008-1009; 
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1009. 
 
In the oft quoted words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
"the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of 
two minds, in one intention, but on the agreement of two 
sets of external signs -- not on the parties' having meant 
the same thing, but on their having said the same thing." 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.Rev. 457, 463 
(1897) (emphasis in original). 
 
In the process of defining the objective intent of the 
parties, a court must examine the entire agreement."A 
writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are 
part of the same transaction are interpreted together." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 202(2). As a corollary 
rule, an "ambiguous subsidiary contractual provision must 
be given an interpretation consistent with the dominant 
purpose of the contract." Barco Urban Renewal, 674 F.2d at 
1009. As an additional aid to proper construction, the court 
should consider the situation of the parties, the attendant 
circumstances and the ends they sought to achieve. Id. at 
1007, quoting Atlantic N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 96 
A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. 1953); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts S 202(1). 
 
The parties chose the term "annuity" in defining the 
company's obligation. "Annuity" is defined as "a right to 
receive fixed, periodic payments, either for life or for a term 
of years . . . A fixed sum payable to a person at specified 
intervals for a specific period of time or for life." Black's 
Law Dictionary, at 90 (6th ed. 1990). Absent indicia that, at 
the time the contract was executed, the parties assigned a 
specialized meaning to an otherwise common term, we will 
 
                                16 
  
not alter its accepted usage. See Mellon Bank , 619 F.2d at 
1009-10. We refuse to read "annuity" as "annuity policy" or 
"annuity contract" in part because these terms have 
distinct meanings, Black's Law Dictionary, at 90, and also 
because the parties, both represented by counsel during 
drafting, could have chosen to make this distinction. Thus, 
the settlement agreement does not require the company to 
purchase an insurance policy - that was only one of the 
options available.4 
 
The ALJ, however, in concluding that no breach had 
occurred, apparently misunderstood the agreement and the 
meaning of "annuity" when he wrote: "[T]he Settlement's 
intent is clear. [The company] was to purchase Mr. Williams 
an annuity in order to provide a `retirement benefit' under 
the terms of the Agreement." In another passage he wrote, 
"if [the company] had not purchased the annuity as stated 
in Section 15 of the Agreement, such inaction would have 
constituted breach of the Agreement." 
 
The record demonstrates that there is little dispute about 
the facts and the parties' intentions in this case. Overall, it 
appears that the parties' perceptions of what they had 
agreed upon were consistent. 
 
In an affidavit submitted by the company, Richard D. 
Quinn, the General Manager -- Compensation and Benefits 
for the company, stated that he was contacted by a 
company official to "seek assistance in structuring 
payments to Mr. Williams as part of an anticipated 
settlement. I was advised that Mr. Williams was to receive 
a benefit that would be equivalent to an immediately 
payable pension, in other words, as if Mr. Williams were 
eligible to retire immediately and receive pension benefits 
like any other [company] retiree under the [company] 
Pension Plan." 
 
Quinn noted that Williams' pension was vested, but he 
was not yet eligible to retire, not having reached age 65. 
The affidavit continued: Therefore, I was asked to arrange 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The modifier "single life" does not alter our reading of the term 
"annuity," which is frequently confused with the method or source of its 
payment. See In re Estate of Dwight, 134 A.2d 45, 48-49 (Pa. 1957). 
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for a separate, immediately payable benefits plan for Mr. 
Williams." 
 
Quinn apparently was given a draft of the proposed 
settlement agreement that mirrored the form ultimately 
executed. He stated: "[when] I saw no direction from these 
provisions as to how the annuity was to be created .. . I 
began to investigate how this could be accomplished before 
the Agreement was signed." 
 
The settlement agreement was executed by the parties on 
April 19, 1994 and approved by the Secretary on June 8, 
1994. In a letter dated August 12, 1994, outside counsel 
advised the company that the purchase of an annuity 
policy of approximately $60,000 would, for tax purposes, be 
considered a transfer to the employee in that amount in the 
current year. The letter suggested that "the prudent course 
would be for [the company] to withhold Federal income tax 
on the payment for Mr. Williams' benefit of about $60,000 
(thus purchasing an annuity for a reduced amount which 
provides smaller annuity payments than provided in the 
Settlement Agreement), [and] report it on a Form 1099 
accordingly . . .." 
 
Robert C. Krueger, Jr., the Director -- Tax Services for 
the company, stated in an affidavit that his first 
involvement in implementation of the settlement agreement 
occurred in August 1994 when he was contacted by Quinn 
and Richard Fryling, the company's General Solicitor. 
Krueger averred, "I was advised that the Settlement 
Agreement required [the company] to create an annuity for 
Mr. Williams, the owner/beneficiary of the annuity, that 
would provide benefits replicating those to which he would 
have been entitled under the [company] Pension Plan if he 
had had sufficient years of service to retire at that time." 
 
Krueger and Quinn then discussed the "alternative of 
making the required annuity payments out of general 
corporate funds as distinct from the purchasing an annuity 
from an outside entity." They rejected that option because 
it "would not have been `in accordance with' (or, as I 
[Krueger] understood the contractual commitment at that 
time, `equivalent to') those under [the company's] qualified 
pension plan." In addition, Krueger and Quinn reasoned 
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that "payment from corporate funds [would be] contingent 
on the continued viability" of the company and therefore 
such an arrangement would not provide Williams with the 
same degree of security as participation in pension funds 
held by an external trust. 
 
This evidence makes it clear that at the time of the 
agreement's execution Williams and the company both 
intended the annuity payments to be "equivalent to an 
immediately payable pension . . . as if Mr. Williams were 
eligible to retire immediately and receive pension benefits 
like any other [company] retiree." 
 
Having discerned that the parties' intentions were 
essentially consistent, we now address the agreement's 
legal operation. In the process of construction, courts must 
often reckon with the effect of events unforeseen or not 
contemplated by the parties at the time agreement is 
reached. Corbin on Contracts S 534, at 11. Here, the 
agreement fails to address the tax consequences of the 
parties' arrangement. The record does not reveal whether 
this omission resulted from oversight or intention. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary for proper construction of the 
agreement to attempt to fill what appears to be a gap. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 204. We do so by 
examining the agreement's underlying purpose and 
integrated provisions. 
 
Under the company's retirement plan, retirees do not pay 
taxes "up front," but only as monthly payments are 
received. However, under the company's choice of options, 
Williams' taxes were paid in advance and at a much higher 
rate. Clearly, he fared less favorably than other retirees. 
 
The record discloses other ways of structuring the 
settlement that would have avoided this problem while 
putting Williams in the same position as other retirees. For 
example, the company could have offered him the option of 
receiving periodic payments from company funds. Or, as 
his expert averred, a different type of annuity insurance 
contract with far more favorable tax consequences was 
available. Moreover, it appears from the record that if the 
company purchased an additional annuity for $25,000, the 
stipulated monthly benefit of $782.35 would be attained. 
 
                                19 
  
The main thrust of the agreement was to provide 
Williams with benefits equivalent to those enjoyed by other 
retirees. That arrangement realistically contemplated 
reasonable equivalency in tax liability so that the usable 
income Williams received would compare fairly with that of 
other company retirees. 
 
The company started off on the right track by considering 
an annuity policy that would have provided the agreed 
upon amount before taxes, but the company became 
distracted by the unusual tax liability created by its plan. 
Losing sight of the fact that the agreement required 
creation of equivalent benefits, the company nevertheless 
pursued its original plan. 
 
Nothing specified or implied in the agreement permitted 
the company to deviate from its obligation to provide the 
intended benefits because of tax or ERISA complexities. 
Those problems made the company's task more difficult, 
but far from insurmountable. We are left with no doubt 
that the company breached the agreement. 
 
On this record, the ALJ's decision as affirmed was legally 
erroneous under basic contract principles. The Secretary's 
derivative determination not to seek enforcement was 
likewise not in accordance with law. 
 
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and remand 
for further proceedings. The Secretary retains the discretion 
whether or not to seek enforcement, but may not consider 
the company's actions as set forth in this record to be in 
compliance with the settlement agreement. In view of the 
Secretary's inability to enforce, Williams is to have the 
opportunity to withdraw his motion if he chooses and 
pursue an action for enforcement in the district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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